Fort Firewall 3.21.0 finally blocks traffic by domain, nearly five years after users asked
For its free, open-source Windows firewall, Nodir Temirkhodjaev shipped the one feature users have nagged him about for the longest: blocking connections by domain name. Fort Firewall 3.21.0 has been released today with built-in DNS Forwarder, ICMP filtering, a handful of ready-made blocklists, and a slightly less clumsy dance with Windows Memory Integrity.
The headline feature dates back to issue #28 under the plain title "Block by domain." The requester wanted wildcard domain blocking, arguing that IP-based rules fall short because a single domain often maps to a pile of IPs, and pointing to OpenSnitch as the model he liked.
The developer kept people waiting, in ways both candid and glacial. In May 2022 he considered bundling dnscrypt-proxy with Fort but flagged a genuine snag: he could not reliably tell which app had requested a domain, since those calls usually funnel through the DNSClient service. By February 2023 he was plain. "No, this feature is not implemented yet," he wrote, and later admitted Fort "can not block hosts by domain names" until then. When asked again in July 2024, he offered a less gracious reply: "There are no plans for updates in the near future, because of other tasks."
Then issue #28 sat quiet. In August 2026 there was still no schedule. On November 17, 2026, Temirkhodjaev closed it with a single line: "Implemented in v3.21.0."
The mechanism turned out to be a DNS Forwarder rather than the dnscrypt-proxy dependency he originally floated. Per the release notes, the Service resolves the system's DNS queries through upstream servers (plain DNS or DNS over HTTPS) and blocks host names caught in Block Zones. In practice Fort now sits between the OS and your resolvers, watches the domains coming back, and can cut them off per-application because it ties each lookup to the program that triggered it. That attribution is the piece that made per-domain blocking actually work, and the driver backs it up by blocking the DNS ports of other programs so nobody can resolve their way around the forwarder through the back door.
More than a patch
Blocking by domain is the story, but 3.21.0 is a batch of features, not a patch. A new host() filter matches rules against resolved domain names, and the Network Filter gains a Host field so rules can target specific domains directly. The Connections window now shows and lets you search host names from the DNS Client's answers, which helps when you want to know precisely what domain a given connection was chasing. Rules and zones also get a Usages tab, so you can see which of them are actually being hit — a small mercy if you have ever stared at 400 rules wondering how many still matter.
ICMP and ICMPv6 filtering land too, with Type and Code fields for the kind of granularity most host firewalls leave alone. The CLI gains dns test|report and zone add|del commands for people who like to script their blocklists. The driver bumps its tommyds data-structure library to 4.0 for faster lookups, and Zones pick up a new Hosts type plus three ready-made sources: OISD Big, StevenBlack, and NetAPI Honeypot. Those are community-curated lists, so one click gets you reputable ad and malware domains without the manual housekeeping.
The trade-off, softened but not settled
Fort has always asked users to disable Windows Memory Integrity, the Core Isolation feature that hardens the kernel. That requirement has never gone away. 3.21.0 just changes how it gets enforced.
The reason is architectural. Fort's driver creates a memory region that is both writable and executable at runtime, because it loads its image dynamically. Part of that was a workaround for a signing problem: Temirkhodjaev says his EV certificate expired and he "don't want to re-new the EV cert," so he built a loader that sidesteps Microsoft's driver-signing checks. Windows Memory Integrity exists precisely to forbid writable-and-executable kernel code, so with it on, the driver historically crashed with a BSOD. He tried an attestation-signing route with a fresh certificate, and it reportedly did not work.
What is new is that the installer no longer refuses to run when HVCI is enabled. The Service now starts the driver unless it detects Memory Integrity running, and warns you when it does. That is a gentler degradation. You can attempt to launch Fort and get told why it fails, instead of being bounced before you even start. The line does not move, though. Fort still cannot operate under Memory Integrity, and turning that protection off removes a real layer of kernel hardening. Enterprises pushing HVCI should get sign-off first.
Head here to grab 3.21.0 from the official release page on GitHub. It runs on Windows 7 and newer, across x86, x86_64, and ARM64 installers.
